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Challenges to the Constitutionality of the
California Divestment Statute
In recent years, many Americans have become increasingly critical
of the apartheid system in South Africa.' Growing racial tensions
and outbreaks of violence in South Africa have caused many people
to challenge the role of the United States government in South
Africa. 2 Discontentment with apartheid has been evidenced by nu-
merous student protests on university campuses and has resulted in
major corporations ceasing operations in South Africa. 3 Opponents
of apartheid have attempted to persuade the government to reduce
or sever political and economic ties with South Africa. 4 Divestment
has been advocated to achieve this end.5 Typical divestment plans
usually require that governmental entities sell all securities invested
in corporations operating in or which have economic ties with South
Africa. 6
1. Schmidt, Impose Tough Sanctions on South Africa, N.Y. T mms, Jan. 17, 1986, at
A31, col. 2 (argument for the United States government, businesses and educational insti-
tutions to impose tougher sanctions on South Africa).
2. See Fighting Apartheid, EcONOMIST Mar. 30, 1985, at 11; Sanctions on South Africa,
EcoNoInsT, Aug. 3, 1985, at 12.
3. See N.Y. Tn&s, May 18, 1986, § 1, at 30, col. 1 (universities debate the costs of
selling investment linked to South Africa); N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 2, 1986, § 1 at 14, col. 3
(pressure rises on colleges to withdraw South African interests); N.Y. Tnsas, Oct. 3, 1986,
at A8, col. 1 (Harvard divests South African holdings).
4. Schmidt, Impose Tough Sanctions on South Africa, N.Y. TMEs, Jan. 17, 1986, at
A31, col. 2.
5. See N.Y. Tims, Apr. 26, 1985, at B4, col. 3 (localities and state press South
African Divestment effort). See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 72-1270 to 72-1276 (1986) (Nebraska
divestment statute); R.I. GEN. LAws § 35-10-12 (1985) (divestment of Rhode Island state
funds and pension funds from any corporation doing business in South Africa); Wis. STAT.
§ 36.29(1) (1975). See also BERKELEY, CAL., REs. 52, 858-N.S. (July 30, 1985) (example of
city ordinance requiring divestment).
6. See Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Actions as an Intrusion upon the
Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813, 816-17 n.21 (1986) (distinguishes
between the terms "divestment" and "disinvestment"). Divestment nmeans the sale of
investments while disinvestment refers to the process by which corporations withdraw
operations. Id. Educational institutions have additionally divested stock in excess of $410
million. Id. at 817.
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Assembly Bill 134 (hereinafter AB 134) requires that California
sever all economic ties with the government of South Africa by
1991. 7 To this end, AB 134 requires the State of California to divest
all state funds from businesses connected to South Africa.' AB 134
further prohibits new investments in businesses tied to South Africa. 9
One week after the passage of AB 134, Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (hereinafter the Act)
over a presidential veto.' 0 This statute establishes a federal mecha-
nism to undermine the apartheid system and assist the victims of
apartheid." Under the federal law, American companies are not
required to sever ties with South Africa. 2 The law merely restricts
corporations from expanding their operations in South Africa."
Several constitutional questions are raised after the enactments
of AB 134 and the federal Anti-Apartheid Act. The first challenge
to AB 134 may be brought under the doctrine of federal preemption.
Since the United States Constitution states that federal law is
supreme, the federal act will preempt the California statute if the
two statutes directly conflict. 4 In absence of direct confrontation,
AB 134 may also be preempted if Congress has expressly or im-
pliedly occupied the entire field of regulation regarding apartheid."'
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16640-16650 (Vest Supp. 1987). See also Review of Selected
1986 California Legislation, 18 PAC. L.J. 543 (1987) (describing the California divestment
law). The bill was signed by the governor on September 26, 1986. Act of Sept. 26, 1986,
ch. 1254, sec. 1, 1986 CAL. LEOIs. SERV. 99, 101-02 (West).
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16641, 16642, 16645, 16646 (West Supp. 1987). But see id. §§
16642.5, 16642.7. (an exception for the noninvestment policy is made when the governing
body of the business adopts a policy not to expand existing operations in South Africa).
See also SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 10, 1987, at A10, col. 1 (California divestment law requires
the state to sell $11.4 billion in pensions funds).
9. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 16641 (West Supp. 1987).
10. See CoMPR ENswE ANn-APARTmzm ACT OF 1986, PuB. L. No. 99-440, 1986 U.S.
CODE CoNo. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 1086 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.). This Act became law on Oct. 2, 1986. See N.Y. Tms, Oct. 3, 1986, at Al, col.
6.
11. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5002 (West Supp. 1987). "The purpose of this Act is to set forth a
comprehensive and complete framework to guide the efforts of the United States in helping
to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and to lead to the establishment of a nonracial,
democratic form of government." Id.
12. See id. § 5060 (no national of the United states shall make any new investment in
South Africa). The definition of national of the United States is any citizen, resident alien,
or business organized under the laws of the United States. Id. § 5001(5).
13. Id. § 5060.
14. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richmond Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1979). A direct
preemption will occur when compliance with both the state and federal law is impossible
due to their inconsistency. Id.
15. See U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § 2 (the Constitution declares that federal laws are
supreme). See also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The Court
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A second challenge to the validity of AB 134 may arise under
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.1 6 Under the
commerce clause, a state has limited powers to interfere with
interstate and foreign commerce. 17 If the investment of funds is
determined to be a "regulation of commerce" for the purposes of
the commerce clause, AB 134 cannot unduly burden interstate or
foreign commerce to further a legitimate local purpose. 18 If the
legislation, however, falls within the market participant exception
to the commerce clause, AB 134 may avoid being deemed uncon-
stitutional. 9 Under the market participant exception, a state may
exert an impact on a market when the state is acting as a participant
rather than a regulator. 20 The market participant doctrine, however,
has never been extended to allow a state to affect foreign com-
merce.
21
Additionally, the validity of AB 134 may face a challenge based
on the California state constitution. 22 The state is required by the
California constitution to invest state trust funds for the exclusive
purpose of serving beneficiaries of the trusts. 23 Since AB 134 uses
the trust funds as a political boycott instead of primarily benefiting
the trust participants, AB 134 may violate this provision of the
state constitution. 24
sets out three ways a state statute may be indirectly preempted. First, the state statute is
preempted if the state legislates in an area Where the federal government has a comprehensive
regulation plan. In addition, a statute may be preempted if the statute frustrates a federal
purpose. Finally, if a state regulates in an area of dominant federal interest, the state statute
is preempted. Id. See Rothschild, A Proposed "Tonic" With Florida Lime to Celebrate our
New Federalism: How to Deal with the "Headache" of Preemption, 38 MiAmI L. REv. 829,
848 (1984) (discussion of implied preemption).
16. See U.S. CoNsr. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. See infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. .137, 142 (1970) (if the state
regulation is evenhanded, then the burden on interstate commerce must be clearly excessive
to be unconstitutional); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (if the state regulation
is discriminatory, then the state must show that less discriminatory alternatives were not
available).
19. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (if the market
participant exception applies, the state actions are outside of the commerce clause).
20. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
21. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 n.9; South Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,
99 (1984) (both cases suggested that the market participant doctine should not be applied
to regulation of foreign commerce).
22. CAL. CoNsT. ART. XVI, § 17 (allows the State of California to invest the trust
funds).
23. Id. (limits the power of the state to invest the trust funds).
24. Id. § 17(b).
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This comment will examine the constitutionality of the California
divestment statute. Both the California statute and the federal
apartheid legislation will be discussed. 25 The doctrine of preemption
will be defined and applied to determine the constitutionality of the
California legislation. 26 AB 134 will then be analyzed for a possible
commerce clause violation.2 7 Next, the applicability of the market
participant exception to the commerce clause will be discussed and
applied to AB 134.28 Finally, the California divestment statute will
be analyzed for possible violations of the California Constitution.29
This comment will conclude that AB 134 is invalid because the
statute has been preempted and violates both the commerce clause
and the California Constitution.
ANTI-APARTHEID LEGISLATION
Both the state and federal apartheid statutes were enacted to
condemn the apartheid system in South Africa.30 The two statutes,
however, approach the problem in different ways. The primary
focus of the federal statute is to define a national policy condemning
apartheid. 31 To this end, the Act regulates all aspects of United
States relations with the government of South Africa. 32 The Cali-
fornia statute addresses apartheid indirectly. AB 134 merely restricts
state investments in businesses with economic ties to South Africa. 33 '
A. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
The Comprehensive Anti-Aparheid Act of 1986 provides a frame-
work for dismantling apartheid and provides relief for the victims
of the system. 34 The Act establishes several sanctions against the
25. See infra text accompanying notes 30-58.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 63-112.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 113-54.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 155-224.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 225-38.
30. Compare 22 U.S.C.A. § 5002 (Vest Supp. 1987) (primary purpose of the legislation
is to end apartheid in South Africa) with Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1, 1986 CAL.
LEGIS. SERV. 99, 101-02, (West) (the legislative findings state that the system of apartheid
is repressive and contrary to all basic principles of this country).
31. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5002 (Vest Supp. 1987) (the purpose of the statute is to give a
comprehensive guide to the efforts of the United States in South Africa).
32. Id.
33. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 16641, 16642 (Vest Supp. 1987). The California statute
only deals with how the State of California may invest their trust funds. No direct regulation
of businesses is affected by the statute. Id.
34. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5002 (Vest Supp. 1987).
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government of South Africa. 35 Many of the sanctions merely codify
the executive orders issued by President Reagan in September of
1985.36 Among other things, the Act bans the import of kruger-
rands,3 7 arms and ammunition, 3 the export of computer 39 and
nuclear technology, 40 and loans to South Africa. 41 In addition to
these sanctions, the Act prohibits United States companies from
making new investments in South Africa, 42 importing certain South
African products43 and exporting petroleum products to South Af-
rica.44
The Act also provides guidelines for the determination of future
policy toward South Africa. 45 These guidelines may allow for the
easing of existing sanctions. 46 The future policy is to be determined
by the annual report of the President on the progress of the South
African government in ending apartheid. 47 After making the report,
the President will have the option of lifting some of the sanctions
or suggesting further action. 48
B. AB 134
The California legislature enacted AB 134 in an effort to end
apartheid. 49 AB 134 prohibits California from investing state trust
funds in any business that has ties to the government or country
of South Africa.50 AB 134 additionally restricts the investment of
35. PuB. L. No. 99-440, TITLE III, 100 STAT. 1086, 1099 (1986) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
36. ExEc. ORDER No. 12,532, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1985). See SENATE Comm. ON FORIGN
RELATIONS, COMPREHENsIvE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 370, 99TH CONG.,
2D SEss., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2334, 2335.
37. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5051 (vest Supp. 1987) (importation of Krugerrands).
38. Id. § 5068 (exportation of arms and ammunition).
39. Id. § 5054 (computers).
40. PuB. L. No. 99-440, § 307, 100 Stat. 1086, 1099-01 (1986) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C.) (nuclear techonology).
41. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5055 (West Supp. 1987) (restriction on loans to South African
entities).
42. Id. § 5060.
43. Id. §§ 5058 (uranium), 5070 (iron and steel), 5069 (agricultrual products and food).
44. Id. § 5071.
45. Id. §§ 5091-5101 (the President can recommend additional measures to Congress if
present standards are not effective to dismantle apartheid).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 5091.
48. Id. § 5092 (the President may lift sanctions if the President reports to Congress the
efforts to end apartheid).
49. Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1, 1986 CAL. LEGis. SERV. 99, 101-02, (West).
50. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16641, 16645 (Vest Supp. 1987). See also id. § 16640(i)
("state trust moneys" means funds administered by the Public Employees' Retirement Fund,
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the trust funds in banks or other lending institutions that make
loans to South African corporations or governmental entities."
Businesses affected by the legislation, however, may be exempted
from the noninvestment policy if the governing board of the business
adopts a resolution not to expand or renew existing agreements or
loans.52 AB 134 also requires the state to divest all funds currently
invested in businesses operating in South Africa: 3
The legislature states two justifications in enacting AB 134. First,
the system of apartheid is contrary to American religious and
political beliefs.5 4 The legislature believes that the investment of
state trust funds in businesses closely tied to apartheid would be
inconsistent with these beliefs.5 5 A second justification for divest-
ment is that the legislature found that investments in South Africa
would be imprudent due to current political and economic upheaval
in South Africa.5 6 This view is bolstered by the fact that divestment
actions already taken by other governmental entities were found to
have had a negative impact on the value of corporate holdings in
South Africa.57 These actions were also found to have lowered the
overall value of securities issued by corporations doing business
there.5 1
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO AB 134
The passage of AB 134 and the federal Anti-Apartheid Act raises
two constitutional issues. Since both statutes legislate on the same
topic, the question of federal preemption must be addressed.5 9 The
federal statute must supersede AB 134 if the California legislation
directly or indirectly undermines the purposes and goals of the
federal actionsA° Additionally, since the investment of funds affects
the State Teachers' Retirement Fund, the Judges' Retirement Fund, etc.); id. § 16640(k)
("state moneys" means all money, bonds, and securities in possession of or collected by
any state agency).
51. Id. §§ 16642, 16646.
52. Id. §§ 16642.5, 16642.7.
53. Id. § 16644.
54. Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1(c), 1986 CAL. LEis, SE.Rv. 99, 101 (West).
The legislature found that the policy of apartheid restricts the freedom of black and colored
people in South Africa. Id. § I(d) at 101.
55. Id. § 1(e) at 101.
56. Id. § 1(h), at 101.
57. Id. § 1(g), at 101.
58. Id.
59. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
60. See infrer notes 68-112 and accompanying text.
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interstate commerce, AB 134 must sustain a commerce clause anal-
ysis to be valid. 6' AB 134 may violate the commerce clause of the
Constitution if the California legislation unduly burdens commerce
in the attempt to undermine apartheid. 62
A. Preemption and the Supremacy Clause
The United States Constitution declares the laws and policies of
the federal government to be the supreme law of the land.6 1 If a
state statute is inconsistent with federal law or policy, the state law
is invalid.6 4 Preemption may occur in one of three ways. Congress
can expressly prohibit the state from legislating in a certain field. 5
Second, a state law may be preempted if the law directly conflicts
with a federal statute or policy.6 6 Third, federal preemption may
occur if the state action is inconsistent with an objective of a federal
statute. 67 Since the Anti-Apartheid Act does not contain an express
preemption provision, this comment will address direct and indirect
preemption.
1. Direct Preemption
Direct preemption occurs when the enforcement of both the state
and federal laws is impossible due to the inconsistency of the laws.6 8
If AB 134 directly conflicts with the federal Anti-Apartheid Act,
the conflict would be in application rather than on the face of the
61. See infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 124-54 and accompanying text.
63. U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § 2. "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " Id.
64. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1979) (a state statute
is void to the the extent that the statute actually conflicts with a federal act).
65. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 689 (1987) (when
acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to preempt state law by so stating
in express terms). See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981) (the
Court interpreted an express preemption). See also Rothschild, supra note 15, at 842-48
(discussion of express preemption).
66. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1824) (established that the state law
must yield when a conflict exists between state and federal law). See also Ray v. Altantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1979) (the state statute is void to the extent that the state
action conflicts with a federal law).
67. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevators, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (if the state law produces a
result that is inconsistent with the objectives of a federal statute, the state law will be
preempted); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (states cannot make laws which
alter existing federal laws relating to aliens). See also Rothschild, supra note 15, at 848-54
(describing the three tests for finding an implied preemption by Congress).
68. Ray, 435 U.S. at 158; California Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 689.
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statute,6 9 since the California statute does not directly restrict busi-
nesses from operating in South Africa.70 The two statutes may
directly conflict in two ways. First, both the California and federal
statutes restrict new investments in South African entities .7 Specif-
ically, the California legislation restricts the state from investing
trust funds in businesses that have ties with South Africa. 72 Cali-
fornia requires that the businesses agree to break all ties with South
Africa before the statute will permit the investment of state funds
in the business .7 3 The federal statute restricts new investments but
does not require a complete economic severence. The federal statute
merely precludes businesses from expanding operations in South
Africa. 74 Since the California and federal statutes directly conflict
as to how to restrict new investments in South Africa, AB 134 may
be preempted.
The second possible area of direct conflict is in the regulation of
loans to South African entities. 75 As a condition of investment of
state funds, AB 134 requires lending institutions not to make new
loans or renew other loans to businesses dealing with South Africa. 76
AB 134 further requires the state to divest securities of all lending
institutions that currently have outstanding loans to South African
entities. 77 Similarly, the federal statute regulates loans by prohibiting
69. Compare CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 16641, 16642, 16645, 16646 (West Supp. 1987)
(restricting state trust funds from being invested in businesses in South Africa, and lending
institutions that have made loans to South African entities) with 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5055, 5060
(West Supp. 1987) (businesses incorporated in the United States may not make new invest-
ments in South Africa or extend new loans to South African entities).
70. CA. GOV'T CODE §§ 16641, 16645 (vest Supp. 1987).
71. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16641, 16642, 16645, 16646 (West Supp. 1987)
(restricting investment of state funds in businesses dealing with South Africa and lending
institutions that have made loans to South African entities) with 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5055, 5060
(West Supp. 1987) (United States businesses may not make new loans or investments to
South Africa).
72. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16641, 16645 (West Supp. 1987).
73. Id. §§ 16641, 16642, 16645, 16646. But see id. §§ 16642.5, 16642.7 (exceptions to
the noninvestment policy require that businesses agree not to renew any existing ties with
South Africa).
74. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5060 (West Supp. 1987) (no national of the United States may make
new investments in South Africa). See id. § 5001(5) ("national" is defined as any citizen,
resident alien or business organized under the laws the United States).
75. The California legislation prevents the investments of funds in a financial institution
that make loans to South African entities. The federal law prevents the making of loans or
extending of credit to the government of South Africa. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
16642, 16646 (vest Supp. 1987) with 22 U.S.C.A. § 5055 (West Supp. 1987) (United States
nationals may not make new loans to South African entities).
76. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16642, 16646 (West Supp. 1987).
77. Id. §§ 16642, 16646.
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all future loans to South African entities. 7  The Act, however,
provides an exemption to allow businesses to make loans to victims
of apartheid for educational and humanitarian purposes. 79 Busi-
nesses that comply with the federal statute may still be subject to
divestment under AB 134. Businesses that do not completely with-
draw from South Africa or that make new loans to victims of the
apartheid system will lose California as an investor. Since both AB
134 and the federal law regulates loans to South Africa, the incon-
sistent sections of AB 134 will be preempted. 0
2. Indirect Preemption
Even if there is no direct conflict between state and federal law,
AB 134 may be superseded by implied congressional intent to
exclude state action."' The courts have generally been reluctant to
find an implied congressional intent to preempt state action when
a state is acting within its inherent police powers.82 The courts
presume that state police powers are not invalidated by the federal
law unless Congress manifests a clear intent to occupy the area. 3
The United States Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe 4 identified
three situations from which an implied intent to preempt can be
inferred. First, the scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive
and comprehensive that a reasonable inference can be drawn that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement the scheme.85
Second, preemption may occur when the act of Congress touches a
field of federal interest so dominant that preclusion from state
interference is presumed. 6 Finally, if the state law produces a result
which is inconsistent with the objectives of the federal statute, the
state law will be preempted.8 7
78. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5055 (West Supp. 1987).
79. Id.
80. Ray v. Altantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1979).
81. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevators, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (criteria under which Congress
may indirectly preempt the state legislation). See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
66-67 (1941) (strong national interest or comprehensive federal plan may preempt the state
legislation); Rothschild, supra note 15, at 848-54 (discussion of ways Congress may impliedly
preempt state action).
82. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Ray, 435 U.S. at 157; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977).
83. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
84. 331 U.S. 218 (1947). For a full discussion of each test under Rice see Rothschild,
supra note 15, at 848-54.
85. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
86. Id.; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941).
87. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Hines, 312 U.S. at 69.
225
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Pursuant to Rice, implied preemption can be found when the
federal law is so comprehensive that the inference can be drawn
that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of regulationA8
Congressional intent to preempt state action may be inferred from
the comprehensive nature of the Anti-Apartheid Act. The stated
purpose of the Act is to establish a "comprehensive and complete
framework" to guide United States efforts to end apartheid. 89 To
achieve this goal, the federal Act establishes political and diplomatic
means to undermine the system of apartheid" and provides assist-
ance to the victims of apartheid. 91 The Act also provides a frame-
work for future United States policy toward South Africa. 92 The
President has directed that the State and Treasury Departments
establish rules and regulations in compliance with the Act. 93 Due to
the comprehensive character of the Act, the Court may infer an
intent by Congress to preempt state action. 94
Implied preemption can also be found under Rice when a state
attempts to regulate in a field of dominant federal interest. 95 Al-
though the investment of state funds is in a field traditionally left
to the states,9 6 an impact on foreign affairs would bring the legis-
88. The federal Act deals with all aspects of relations with South Africa. The Act sets
forth the sanctions by the United States against South' Africa and also the means to assist
the victims of apartheid. Finally the Act provides the means by which the United States will
address the future policy with South Africa. See COMPREHEN s ANTI-APARTHEID ACT OF
1986, PUB. L. No. 99-440, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1086 (1986) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
89. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 5002 (West Supp. 1987).
90. Id. § 5011.
91. See PUB. L. No. 99-440, TITLE III, 100 STAT. 1086, 1099 (1986) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
92. See PUB. L. No. 99-440, TITLE V, 100 STAT. 1086, 1108 (1986) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) The Act provides the means to lift these sanctions against
South Africa when the purposes of the statute have been fulfilled. Id.
93. See ExEc. ORDER No. 12,571, 51 FED. REG. 39,505 (1986). See also 51 FED. REG.
41,906-11, 41,916-18 (rules and regulations from the Department of the Treasury imple-
menting the Executive Order); 51 FED. REG. 41,912-14 (rules and regulations by the
Department of State implementing the Executive Order).
94. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevators, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (a pervasive federal scheme
of regulation can lead to an inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement
the scheme); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 (1941) (Congress has exclusively regulated
the rights of aliens in this country, including how they may enter, how they may become
citizens and the manner in which they can be deported).
95. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (if an act of Congress touches on a field of dominant federal
interest, the federal system will be presumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject); Hines, 312 U.S. at 62 (the regulation of aliens is a specified power vested in
Congress, and is in an area of foreign relations).
96. See Note, supra note 6, at 847 (the impact, however, of investment decisions upon
international commerce and foreign affairs implicates national interests).
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lation in the realm of national interest. 97 The United States Supreme
Court in Zschernig v. Miller98 held that state legislation that pro-
duces more than incidental or indirect effects on foreign relations
is invalid because the legislation encroaches on federal powers. 99 In
Zschernig, an Oregon statute that denied inheritance rights to non-
resident aliens whose national government did not provide similar
rights to Americans was ruled unconstitutional. 100 The primary
purpose of the statute was to attack communism. 101 Although the
Oregon legislature was exercising the inherent state power of estab-
lishing intestate succession laws, the exercise of that power to express
foreign policy was unconsitutional. 0 2 The Zschernig decision casts
doubt on the power of the states to enact laws that create "public
policy" in international situations. AB 134 is similar to the Oregon
statute in Zschernig. Both statutes were enacted to criticize another
political system. As Oregon used the power of intestate succession
to further foreign policy, the California statute uses the investment
of state funds to establish foreign policy.'0 The attempt by Cali-
97. Id. The Constitution affirmatively grants powers of foreign affairs to the federal
government. See U.S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 10 (denies the states the power to enter into treaties
or compacts with a foreign nation; to levy import and export taxes; and to engage in war);
id. ART. I, § 8 (gives Congress the power to engage in war, to provide and maintain a Navy,
and to establish a uniform rule of naturalization). See also L. HENKIN, FoaExoN ATFAms
AND THE CoNsTrrtrioN 228 (1972) (the language of the Constitution and the interpretation
by the courts reduced the ability of the states to affect foreign relations).
The Supreme Court held that even without the express constitutional provisions, all of
the foreign relations powers would be inherently vested in the national government. United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936). See Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968). The Constitution entrusts foreign affairs and international relations
solely to the federal government. Id. See also L. HENKN, supra, at 227-28 (foreign relations
is an area in which the federal interest is dominant, if not absolute).
98. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
99. Id. at 434. See L. HEN'n, supra note 97, at 240-41 (the line between incidental
and direct effect on foreign affairs is uncertain); Note, supia note 6, 843-44 (the primary
concern of Zschernig was that the Oregon law had more than an indirect effect on foreign
relations). But cf. Note, State Buy-American Laws-Invalidity of State Attempts to Favor
American Producers, 64 MINN. L. REv. 387, 407 (1980) (states may have some indirect
effects on foreign affairs because that the exercise of nearly all state powers has some effect
on foreign affairs).
100. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437-38.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 439 (those rights must give way when they impair the effective exercising of
the foreign policy of the federal government). The Oregon statute was struck down even
though the Justice Department stated that the Oregon escheat law did not interfere with the
conduct of foreign relations by the United States. L. HENKIN, supra note 97, at 239.
103. The Oregon statute was enacted to criticize communism. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at
437. AB 134 was primarily enacted as a criticism of the system of apartheid in South Africa.
Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1, 1986 CAL. LEGis. SERV. 99, 101-02 (West). See
Note, supra note 6, at 845. (After Zschernig, laws motivated by such inquires would not
seem constitutionally defensible).
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fornia to exercise that right to break all economic ties with South
Africa would be an intrusion upon powers traditionally held by the
federal government.'04 Since foreign relations powers are inherent
in the national government, AB 134 is preempted from entering the
field of foreign relations. 05
Finally, Rice mandates that a frustration of federal purpose also
results in implied preemption.106 Pursuant to Rice, a state law that
obstructs the accomplishment of the full purpose and objectives of
the federal government must fall.107 The policy of the federal Act
is to encourage certain ties to South Africa. 08 The Act attempts to
assist the victims of apartheid. 10 9 The Act does not advocate full
withdrawal from South Africa by American companies, but merely
restricts new investments in South Africa." 0 The California statute,
on the other hand, is much broader in scope than the Anti-Apartheid
Act. The intent of the California statute is to sever all economic
links to South Africa."' Divestment by the State of California
indirectly affects the victims, as well as the proponents of the system
of apartheid. To this extent, the federal purpose of supporting the
victims is frustrated by AB 134. Since AB 134 extends beyond and
frustrates the federal purposes of the Anti-Apartheid Act, AB 134
should be preempted." 2
The doctrine of federal preemption provides legitimate challenges
to the constitutionality of the California divestment statute. AB 134
directly conflicts with the federal statute with respect to loans and
new investments in businesses operating in South Africa. Further-
more, since the California divestment law intrudes upon the foreign
relations powers of the federal government, Congress has impliedly
104. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437; L. HENKiN, supra note 97, at 239.
105. L. HENKN, supra note 97, at 242.
106. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevators, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
107. Id.; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); California Fed. Say. & Loan v.
Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 689 (1987). 132 CONG. REc. S11,817-18 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986).
In the opinion of Senator Richard Lugar, the states have been preempted by the passage of
the Act. "I would just suggest that we clarify the entire predicament by stating that when
we get into an antiapartheid law, the Federal Government is speaking for the Nation, not
each city and each county. They might have spoken to try to get our attention. They have
gotten our attention." Id. at S11,818.
108. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 5031 (Vest Supp. 1987) (the Act encourages the assistance to
victims of the system).
109. Id.
110. See PuB. L. No. 99-440, TITLE II, 100 STAT. 1086, 1094 (1986) (to be codified in
scattered sections at 22 U.S.C.A.).
111. Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1, 1986 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 99, 101-02, (West).
112. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
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barred any state action. AB 134 additionally frustrates some of the
underlying purposes of the federal Anti-Apartheid Act. Since Con-
gress did not clearly manifest consent to pass divestment statutes,
AB 134 is an unconstitutional intrusion upon the powers of the
federal government.
B. Commerce Clause
The commerce clause provides an additional constitutional chal-
lenge to AB 134. The Constitution grants Congress the power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce." 3 The United States Su-
preme Court has interpreted this affirmative grant of power to
Congress as implicitly restricting the power of the states to regulate
commerce." 4 This implicit limitation has been referred to as the
"dormant" commerce clause and has been used to invalidate state
laws that unduly burden interstate commerce." 5 In the absence of
federal action, however, the Court has allowed the states to regulate
commerce when relying upon inherent police powers." 6 More exten-
sive constitutional scrutiny is required when a state attempts to
regulate foreign commerce.1 7 A state statute may escape the purview
of the commerce clause entirely if the state enters a specific market
as a participant rather than a regulator." 8
1. Traditional Tests
The Supreme Court has developed a two-part analysis to deter-
mine the extent of state power under the dormant commerce clause." 9
If a state law discriminates in favor of a local interest, the state
bears the burden of proving that a legitimate local interest cannot
be attained through less discriminatory means. 20 If, however, the
state law does not discriminate on the basis of residency and
effectuates a legitimate local purpose, the law will be upheld unless
the incidental burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly
113. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3.
114. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318-19 (1851).
115. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 330 (1979); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-41 (1949); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781
(1945).
116. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318.
117. See Japan Lines v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
118. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809-10 (1976) (the commerce
clause does not prohibit states from participating in the market to favor their own citzens).
119. County Commissioners of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 14 (1984).
120. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
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excessive in relation to the benefits acquired to further that pur-
pose. 121 State laws which are enacted strictly to protect local eco-
nomic interests rarely pass commerce clause scrutiny. 22 A statute
that affects foreign commerce must undergo a more extensive con-
stitutional scrutiny because of the possibility the state statute may
prevent the federal government from maintaining a uniform foreign
policy.123
If AB 134 affects both interstate and foreign commerce, the
statute must satisfy the commerce clause or come within one of the
recognized exceptions to the commerce clause to be constitutional. 124
"Commerce" has been interpreted broadly to include every type of
movement of persons and things, tangible and intangible 25 The
investment of state funds into businesses and financial institutions
would constitute commerce. 26 Since AB 134 restricts the ability of
the state to invest in businesses operating in South Africa, the
statute has an effect on interstate commerce. 27 The regulatory effect
of AB 134 is evenhanded in application because the legislation does
not distinguish between resident and nonresident businesses.1 28
Therefore, AB 134 is constitutional unless the burden imposed on
interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
benefits furthering a legitimate local purpose. 29
The primary purpose of AB 134 is to condemn and to attempt
to eliminate the system of apartheid. 30 Traditionally, legitimate
121. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
122. Philadephia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (economic protectionist statutes
are per se unconstitutional because the statutes are contrary to the underlying principles of
federalism).
123. Japan Lines v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979). In Japan Lines,
the constitutionality of a state taxation statute was at issue. The Court held that the tax
cannot enhance the risk of multiple taxation. In addition, the state action may not impair
federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential. Id. at 448.
124. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3 (power vested in Congress).
125. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944).
126. See Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. S.E.C., 100 F.2d 888, 890 (1939) (securities are the
subject of interstate commerce). The investment of state funds in securites would have a
substantial influence on interstate commerce. All the divestment actions of the various states,
taken in the aggregate, could substantially burden interstate commerce. Even though the
aggregate theory has only been applied to give Congress the power to regulate commerce,
a similar argument could be made for the interference of state action on commerce. See
also Lewis v. BT Investment, 447 U.S. 27, 39 (1980) (the same interstate attributes that
establish the power of Congress to regulate commerce also support constitutional limitations
on the power of the states). See Note, supra note 6, at 835 n.128.
127. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16640(b), (c) (West Supp. 1987). The statute does not make
a distinction between resident and nonresident businesses, but affects all businesses that are
operating in South Africa. Id.
128. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
129. See id.
130. Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. l(a)-(h), 1986 CAL. LEois. SERV. 99, 101-02(West).
230
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purposes for commerce clause analysis have been limited to the
protection of health, safety, and financial prosperity of the people
and industries of the State.'13 Expression of moral outrage has never
been found by the courts to constitute a legitimate purpose.132 A
statute with the sole purpose of expressing moral outrage therefore
would not be a justifiable imposition upon interstate or foreign
commerce.133 A second purpose behind AB 134 is the protection of
the investment of trust funds. 34 The legislature determined that an
investment into securities of businesses with ties to South Africa is
imprudent given the current political and economic stability of the
country.3 5 This may be a plausible purpose, if the businesses
depended upon their South African connection for their continued
viability. 31 California, however, cannot insulate state actions by
creating other justifications for divestment in an effort to further
an otherwise illegitimate purpose. 37 Since no legitimate local benefit
is furthered by the legislation, any imposition on interstate com-
merce would be a violation of the commerce clause.
AB 134 must overcome a more extensive constitutional scrunity
because divestment involves foreign commerce. 3 The Supreme Court
has consistently invalidated, with few exceptions, 39 state laws that
created barriers between the trade of the United States and other
countries. 40 In Japan Lines, Ltd v. County of Los Angeles,'4' the
Court held that a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required
131. See Note, Constitutionality of the No Discrimination Regulating Univeristy of
Wisconsin Investments, 1978 Wis. L. Ray. 1059, 1064. Historically, the United States
Supreme Court has defined legitimate local interests to include promoting the health and
safety of state residents and maximizing the financial return of state industries. See id. at
1064 n.43. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madision, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970).
132. See Note, supra note 131, at 1064. A possible benefit of AB 134 is knowledge that
a change in the apartheid system has been promoted through state's action. This intangible
and rather tenuous benefit is not the type historically acknowledged as a legitimate local
benefit. See id.
133. See Note, supra note 6, at 823.
134. Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1(g)-(h), 1986 CAL. LECis. SERV. 99, 101
(Vest).
135. Id.
136. See Note, supra note 6, at 823 n.57.
137. Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 380 (1939) (rejecting Florida's attempt
to justify the inspection of imported cement on safety grounds). See Note, supra note 6, at
834 (a state law which bases a divestment statute on ending apartheid should not be
considered a legitimate interest); Note, supra note 131, at 1064 (no local public interest is
furthered by the Wisconsin divestment statute).
138. See Japan Lines, Ltd v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
139. See Note, supra note 6, at 835.
140. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
141. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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when a state attempts to regulate foreign commerce. 142 In that case,
a state law that assessed a property tax against containers previously
taxed in the originating country was invalidated. 143 The Court rec-
ognized that the tax would have been valid if the containers had
merely been instrumentalities of interstate commerce.' 44 Since the
containers, however, were used constantly and exclusively for the
transportation of cargo in foreign commerce,' 45 two additional tests
had to be satisfied for the tax to be constitutional. 146 First, the tax
could not create a substantial risk of international multiple taxa-
tion.4 7 More importantly, the tax could not prevent the federal
government from maintaining a uniform foreign policy when reg-
ulating commercial relations with foreign governments.' 48 Even
though Japan Lines addressed tax regulation, the language of the
opinion is broad enough to extend to all foreign commerce regu-
lation. 149
Since AB 134 affects participation of businesses in the interna-
tional market, the legislation must meet the Japan Lines test to be
upheld. While AB 134 is not a tax case, the statute may prevent
the federal government from maintaining a uniform foreign pol-
icy. 50 Both the President and Congress have spoken out against
apartheid.' 5' These federal actions have established a comprehensive
framework under which the United States intends to address the
problems of apartheid. If each city, county, or state government
was allowed to address the matter of apartheid individually, multiple
signals might be sent to businesses connected with South Africa. 152
AB 134 encourages businesses to sever all ties with South Africa."3
142. Id. at 446.
143. Id. at 436-37.
144. Id. at 445 (the state tax would have survived the Complete Auto test). See Complete
Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (the state tax is valid if the tax is
substantially connected to the taxing state and does not discriminate against interstate
commerce).
145. Japan Lines, 441 U.S. at 446 n.9.
146. Id. at 446.
147. Id. at 446-48.
148. Id. at 44849.
149. See Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 n.9 (1980). The Supreme Court cited
Japan Lines in a nontax case for the proposition that the commerce clause scrunity may be
more rigorous when restraint on foreign commerce is alleged. Id.
150. Japan Lines, 441 U.S. at 448-49.
151. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 5002 (West Supp. 1987).
152. See 132 CONG. REc. Sl1,817 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statements by Senator
Lugar) (stressing the need for the federal government to speak with one voice on apartheid
by preempting state action).
153. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 16642, 16646 (west Supp. 1987).
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The federal Act encourages businesses to maintain and establish ties
with the victims of apartheid in South Africa.154 AB 134 therefore
conflicts with the signal that the federal government intends to send
to businesses and the government of South Africa. This interference
with foreign commerce would not meet the stricter Japan Lines
standard.
2. The Market Participant Exception
Even if AB 134 does not survive scrutiny of the commerce clause,
AB 134 may still be valid if the market participant exception is
applicable. 155 Generally, if the state enters the market as a partici-
pant, rather than a regulator, the actions of the state are beyond
the reach of the commerce clause. 156 The state becomes a market
participant when the state enters a particular market as a private
trader, such as a buyer, seller, or employer. 157 A state is a market
regulator when the state prescribes the rules of trade between private
parties. 158
a. The Development of the Doctrine
The market participant doctrine was first established by the
Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap. 59 In Alexandria
Scrap, a Maryland statute which allowed the State of Maryland to
pay a bounty to licensed scrap processors for the destruction of
abandoned autos titled in Maryland was upheld. 60 Before the scrap
processor could receive the bounty, the processors had to submit
specific documentations of ownership to the state. 1 1 The statute
required more extensive documentation from out-of-state processors
154. See PuB. L. No. 99-440, TrrLE II, 100 STAT. 1086, 1094 (1986) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
155. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976); Reeves v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980); white v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S.
204, 210 (1983). See also Note, The Market Participant Test in Dormant Commerce Clause
Analysis-Protecting Protectionism?, 1985 DUKE L.J. 697, 697 (if the state is a market
participant, then the commerce clause does not apply to the transaction).
156. Alexandria, 426 U.S. at 806-07; Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436; White, 460 U.S. at 210;
South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 95 (1984).
157. See Note, supra note 155 at 705; Note, Setting Parameters on the Market Participant
Doctrine: South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 30 J. U"a. & CONTEMP.
L., 241, 241 (1986).
158. See Note, supra note 157 at 241.
159. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
160. Id. at 796-98.
161. Id. at 798.
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than from their in-state counterparts. 62 The Maryland statute could
have been invalidated as protectionist legislation. 163 The Court held,
however, that the commerce clause did not forbid a state from
favoring resident citizens over others because the state was partici-
pating in the market for a legitimate purpose.' 64 Importantly, the
Court found that the out-of-state processors were not barred from
the market.1 65 Therefore, the statute did not interrupt interstate
commerce, but merely made the processing more lucrative in the
state than out of the state. 66
In Reeves v. Stake, 67 the Court further defined and expanded
the market participant doctrine.i6s In Reeves, the State of South
Dakota owned and operated a cement plant. 6 9 During a cement
shortage, the state restricted the sale of the state-owned goods to
accommodate the needs of South Dakota residents before offering
the goods to other potential buyers. 70 After Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap, the Court would first determine if the state was an actual
participant in the market. Next, the Court would determine if the
intrusion on interstate commerce was excessive.' 7' The Reeves Court
held that the sole inquiry in determining the applicability of the
doctrine was whether the challenged state action constituted actual
participation in the market. 172 The Court justified the market par-
ticipant doctrine on the grounds of state sovereignity,17 1 the role of
the state as trustee for people of the state, 74 and the recognized
right of traders and manufacturers to exercise their independent
discretion in determining the parties with which they will deal. 75
The Court suggested that a state acting as a proprietor should be
as free as other "private traders.' 7 6
162. Id. at 800.
163. Id. at 804. See also Note, supra note 155, at 708-09.
164. Alexandria, 426 U.S. at 809. The legitimate state purpose was the maintenance of
clean and clear roadways. Id.
165. Id. at 810.
166. Id. at 806-07 n.15.
167. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
168. Id. at 436-37.
169. Id. at 430.
170. Id. at 432-33.
171. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 804 (1976).
172. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439; White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers,
460 U.S. 204, 220 (1983).
173. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 438-39.
176. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439. The Court included any form of state proprietary action
in the definition of the exemption. Id.
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The Court in White v. Massachuetts Council of Construction
Employers 77 extended the market participant doctrine to the furthest
limits. The Court upheld an order by the Mayor of Boston that
required all construction projects funded in whole or in part by the
city to hire a minimum of fifty percent of Boston residents.178
Following Reeves, the White Court focused on whether the City of
Boston was in fact a participant in the construction market or a
regulator of that market. 179 Despite the substantial intrusion on
interstate commerce by the City, the Court found the City to be a
market participant and upheld the order. 180
White extended the market participant doctrine beyond the orginal
contracting parties.18 1 Without setting any limits for the exception,
the Court recognized that participation of Boston in the market
could extend beyond the immediate contracting parties to affect a
discrete, identifiable class of economic activity. 82 The fact that the
employees affected by the order worked for the city was crucial to
extension of the market participant exception beyond the boundaries
of Alexandria and Reeves.'83
The United States Supreme Court in South-Central Timber v.
Wunnicke, 84 however, retreated from the broad language in White.'85
177. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
178. Id. at 206.
179. Id. at 208 (citing Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436 n.7).
180. Id. at 208.
181. Id. at 217 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The parties to
the contract in Reeves were the state of South Dakota and the buyers of the cement. See
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 431. The parties in Alexandria consisted of the State of Maryland and
the scrap processors who received the bounty. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 802 (1976).
182. White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7.
Justice Blackmun's opinion dissenting in part argues that the Mayor's order goes
beyond market participation because [the order] regulates employment contracts
between public contractors and their employees. We agree with Justice Blackmun
that there are some limits on a state or local government's ability to impose
restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the government
transacts business. We find it unnecessary in this case to define those limits with
precision, except to say that we think the commerce clause does not require the
city to stop at the boundary of formal privity of contract. In this case, the Mayor's
executive order covers a discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which
the city is a major participant.
Id.
183. Id. See South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 95 (1984). The fact that
the employees were 'working for the city' was crucial to the market participant analysis in
White. Id. See also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 219 (1984).
184. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
185. See Note, supra note 157, at 241.
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In South-Central, the State of Alaska required that all buyers of
Alaskan timber contractually agree that the timber be partially
processed within the state. 186 The plurality of the Court limited the
market participant doctrine to allow the state to affect only a
discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which the state is
a major participant.8 7 The Court stressed the necessity of narrowly
defining the term "market" to prevent the principles of the com-
merce clause from being swallowed up by the exception.' 88 The
Court expressed two additional reasons for the limitation of the
market participant doctrine. First, the interest of the state as a
"private trader" is in the immediate transaction, not in what the
purchaser does with the goods after the transaction. 8 9 Second,
downstream restrictions have a greater regulatory effect than limi-
tations on the immediate transaction. 90
The parameters of the market participant doctrine are still ob-
scure.' 9' The test under Reeves and White is whether the state is a
participant in the market rather than a market regulator. 92 After
South-Central, a state may only participate in a market that is
narrowly defined. 93 If the state exerts an influence beyond that
limited market, the effect becomes regulatory in nature and the
market participant exception does not apply. 94
b. Application of the Doctrine to AB 134
AB 134 can avoid the commerce clause analysis if California is
found to be a market participant rather than a market regulator.
186. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 84-87.
187. Id. at 97 (citing White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. 460 U.S. at 211, n.7).
188. Id. at 97-98. The term "market" must be relatively narrowly defined in order to
prevent the commerce clause from being swallowed up by the market participant exception.
States may not impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce even if they act with the
permissible state purpose of fostering local industry. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. After South-Central several issues remained unresolved. First, the distinction be-
tween what state action constitutes market participation versus market regulation is unclear.
A second issue is how narrowly the term "market" will be defined. Finally, the extent to
which a participating state may affect commerce outside of that market is unclear. See Note,
supra note 155, at 722.
192. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980); White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 210 (1983). See also Note, supra note 155, at 722. The
White Court recognized possible limitations on the market participant doctine without stating
what the limitations might be. See White, 460 U.S. at 211, n.7; Note, supra note 157, at
244.
193. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 98.
194. Id.
236
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California is acting in a proprietary function under AB 134 because
the state is investing moneys derived from the funds entrusted to
the state. 195 As in Alexandria Scrap, California is merely acting as
a "private trader" in determining with whom the state will invest
the state trust funds. Under Reeves and White, the role of California
as a private trader in the investment market would be sufficient to
invoke the market participant exception. 196 The state, however, must
overcome the obstacles presented in South-Central before invoking
the exception. 9 7
In South-Central, the Court held that the term "market" must
be narrowly defined. 98 The application of the exception was also
restricted to that market. 99 Any attempt by the state to impose
conditions outside of the participating market would be regulatory
in nature, and the market participant exception would be inappl-
icable. 200 California, through AB 134, is participating in the invest-
ment market.20 1 The effect of AB 134 reaches beyond this market,
at least to the extent that the statute conditions investment on the
business agreeing to pull out of South Africa. The attempt by AB
134 to influence these operations in South Africa is regulatory in
nature. Therefore, the market participant exception should not be
applied to AB 134.
Even if California surpasses the obstacles presented by South-
Central, the market participant doctrine may still not be applied to
AB 134 for policy reasons. The market participant doctrine was
established in Alexandria Scrap as a narrow exception the the
commerce clause. 202 The rationale of the doctrine was to allow states
to favor their own residents when participating in a market. 20 3 No
subsequent market participant case has extended the doctrine beyond
this rationale. 204 The Reeves Court reaffirmed this rationale by
195. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439; White, 460 U.S. at 220 (proprietary activity not
necessary for the market participant doctrine).
196. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439; White, 460 U.S. at 220.




201. California may be a market participant when investing funds. AB 134, however, is
not solely concerned with the investment of the trust funds. The legislation attempts to
direct where the business will operate. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16641, 16642
(West Supp. 1987) (AB 134 applies to businesses or institutions that have economic ties to
South Africa).
202. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 804 (1976).
203. Id.
204. In Alexandria, the local economic interest was to benefit the local scrap processors.
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stating that one justification for the exception was due to the
fiduciary duties the state owed its residents.
AB 134 was not enacted primarily to benefit the residents of
California.20 5 The California divestment law does not tangibly ben-
efit the residents of California. 201 The only true beneficiaries of the
legislation are the South Africans who would benefit from the
dismantling of apartheid.20 7 Nor was AB 134 enacted to provide for
any local economic interest. AB 134 was enacted as a political
statement against the system of apartheid.2 08
Finally, the extent of the participation of California in the market
under AB 134 is not as great as the governmental involvement in
the market participant cases. In each of those cases, the government
was involved in the creation of a particular product or market and
each market was dependent upon the participation by the State for
its existence. 9 In the situation at hand, the securities purchased by
California were in the market prior to the enactment of AB 134.
The securites will continue to exist even if California divests from
the businesses in South Africa. For California to have a similar
type of involvement in the creation of the market as the market
participant cases, California would need to have been the issuer of
the securities instead of the purchaser.2 10 Since some of the inherent
Alexandria, 426 U.S. at 802. Similarly in Reeves, the market participant doctrine was
invoked to benefit the local cement market. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980). The
White Court invoked the doctrine to provide employment for local residents. White v.
Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 221 (1983).
205. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438. The other two justifications stated in Reeves has been
limited by two subsequent Supreme Court cases. The justification based on state sovereignty
is questionable after Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. The Court in Garcia held
that states cannot avoid the commerce clause based on state sovereignty. See Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). The second justification was that
states should be able to decide the parties with whom they will deal. This justification is
not at issue with AB 134 if the market is narrowly defined following South-Central. See
South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98 (1984); supra note 201 and accompanying
text.
206. Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1, 1986 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 99, 101-02, (West).
207. See Note, supra note 131, at 1064.
208. Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1, 1986 CAL. LEGis. SRv. 99, 101-02 (West).
209. In Alexandria, the state of Maryland used state funds to pay a bounty to scrap
dealers who processed abandoned autos. The market was state-created. This point was
stressed in Justice Stevens' concurring opinion. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 815 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Reeves, South Dakota owned and operated
its own cement plant. The market participant doctrine was involved only to the extent the
sales were generated from that plant. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 430. In White, the city of
Boston hired employees for a particular construction project. See White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 206 (1983).
210. See Alexandria, 426 U.S. at 798 (Maryland was a seller of a bounty); Reeves, 447
U.S. at 430 (South Dakota sold cement); White, 460 U.S. at 206 (city of Boston was an
employer for a construction project).
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reasons underlying the market participant doctrine are not present
with AB 134, the doctrine should not be extended to the divestment
procedures of California.
c. Foreign Commerce and the Market Paricipant Doctrine
Even if a court determines California to be a market participant,
an additional question arises since AB 134 affects foreign commerce.
Each of the market participant cases upheld by the Supreme Court
have dealt with interstate commerce. 2 1 KSB v. New Jersey,212 an
early state court decision, held that the market participant doctrine
applied to Buy-American statutes213 even though the legislation
affected foreign commerce. 214 The New Jersey Supreme Court found
that the differences between interstate and foreign commerce were
insufficient to justify not applying the exception to the sphere of
foreign commerce. 215 The United States Supreme Court, however,
subsequently made a distinction between interstate and foreign
commerce in Japan Lines v. County of Los Angeles.2 6 Japan Lines
held that regulation of foreign commerce was subject to a more
rigorous constitutional scrutiny than interstate commerce. 21 7 Fur-
thermore, in a footnote in Reeves v. Stake, the United States
Supreme Court stated the market participant doctrine may not apply
when dealing with natural resources or with the regulation of foreign
commerce. 21 8 These limitations were later affirmed in dictum in
South-Central v. Wunnicke.2 9 The Court in South-Central stated
that even if Alaska had been a market participant, the doctrine
would not have applied because of the interference with foreign
commerce.
220
In light of these cases, an application of the market participant
exception to AB 134 would be an unjustified extension of the
doctrine. First, the reason for the market participant doctrine was
211. See Note, supra note 6, at 823.
212. 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977).
213. "Buy-American" statutes generally require all products purchased by the government
be made in this country. See K.S.B. v. New Jersey, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774, 776, (1977).
214. Id. at 775.
215. Id. at 788.
216. Japan Lines v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
217. Id. The Reeves Court cited Japan Lines for the proposition that regulation of
foreign commerce must undergo a more rigorous constitutional scrutiny. Reeves v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980).
218. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 n.9.
219. South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96 (1984).
220. Id. See Note, supra note 6, at 839.
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to enable the states to fulfill their fiduciary and proprietary obli-
gations with the same limited restrictions as other "private traders"
when entering the market as a participant. 22' The doctrine has not
been justified to express moral outrage or foreign policy. To extend
the market participant doctrine to AB 134 for this purpose would
seem to give the states enormous powers to avoid the Commerce
Clause by disguising their actions as market participants. 222 Sec-
ondly, AB 134 not only affects interstate commerce, but also has
a substantial impact on foreign commerce. 2 13 An extension to include
foreign commerce has been criticized by the United States Supreme
Court. 224 Thus, any further extension of the market participant
exception to accommodate AB 134 would seem unlikely. Since AB
134 is not protected from the Commerce Clause by the market
participant doctrine, the California divestment law is unconstitu-
tional.
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 17
California amended Article XVI, section 17 of the state consti-
tution with the passage of Proposition 21 in June of 1984.225 This
amendment authorized the legislature to invest all trust funds from
public pension and retirement systems. 2 6 When investing these funds,
the legislature is required to exercise the skill and care of a prudent
investor.22 7 If the state exercises this power under Article XVI,
section 17, the state has a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries to
provide the greatest returns with the least amount of risk.228 In
addition, the exclusive purpose for the investment of the funds
must be to benefit the participants of the plans. 229
221. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980).
222. See South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99 n.l1 (1984). A state could
avoid South-Central by merely including a provision in the contract stating that the title
does not pass until the processing is complete. The substance of the transaction rather than
the label, is the important factor that governs the commerce clause analysis. Id.
223. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
224. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980); South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at
99.
225. Proposition 21 was passed by the people on June 4, 1984. See CAL. CoNsT. ART.
XVI, § 17.
226. Id.
227. Id. § 17(c). "The fiduciary of the public pension or retirement system shall discharge
his or her duties with respect to the system with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and
familiar with these matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aims." (emphasis added). Id.
228. Id. § 17(d).
229. Id. § 17(b). The fiduciary shall discharge the duty solely in the interest of, and for
the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to the participants. Id.
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AB 134 limits the power of the legislature to exercise this fiduciary
duty. Under AB 134, the state is restricted from investing in business
with economic ties to South Africa. 20 Due to this limitation of
investment power by AB 134, the statute may violate the California
Constitution. In response to this constitutional provision, the leg-
islature found that the investment into securities of businesses with
ties to South Africa would be imprudent given the current political
and economic stability of the country. 23' A mere legislative finding,
however, may not overcome the constitutional duty imposed on the
state. 232 A prudent investor should base the investment decisions on
more reliable standards other than on the place where the business
may have some contact. 233 Since the true purpose of the statute was
to protest against apartheid, 234 the funds are arguably being used
as a political boycott and not for the exclusive purpose of benefiting
the participants. 2 5
The duty of the state to perform in the sole interest of the
beneficiaries must be exercised to provide the participants the great-
est economic gain. 236 All other purposes are forbidden by the
constitution. 237 AB 134 prevents the state from investing in certain
businesses, primarily to protest against apartheid in South Africa.
238
Since the divestment statute infringes upon the power of the state
to invest the trust funds, this infringement must be for the sole
economic purpose of benefiting the participants to be constitutional.
A "political boycott" use of the trust funds would be a direct
violation of the state constitutional provision. Since AB 134 advo-
cates the withdrawal of investment from South Africa without any
true economic gain to the beneficiaries of the trusts, the action
would violate the state constitution.
230. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 16641, 16642 (West Supp. 1987) (California restricts
investments in businesses and lending institutions doing business in South Africa).
231. See Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1, 1986 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 99, 101 (West).
232. See CAL. CONST. ART. XVI, § 17.
233. See Note, supra note 6, at 823.
234. See Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1(a)- (e), 1986 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 99, 101
(West).
235. See CAL. CoNsT. ART. XVI, § 17. AB 134 may additionally require California to
breach the constitutional fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries. Under § 17 of Article XVI,
California must use the care of a prudent investor. The requirement to divest certain funds
based solely on where the business operates may breach that duty. Additional investment
criteria exist other than whether or ndt the business has contacts with South Africa. See id.
§ 17(c) (fiduciaries' standard of care).
236. Id. § 17(b).
237. Id.
238. See Act of Sept. 26, 1986, ch. 1254, sec. 1, 1986 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 99, 101 (West).
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CONCLUSION
This comment has explored possible constitutional challenges to
AB 134. The enactment of both the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act and AD 134 raises a possible federal preemption challenge.
Since both statutes regulate new investments and loans to South
Africa, AB 134 may be directly preempted to the extent the statute
is inconsistent with the federal Act. AD 134 may also be indirectly
preempted since the legislation regulates in a field traditionally held
by the federal government. AD 134 may additionally be challenged
as a violation of the commerce clause because the statute is an
unjustified imposition on both interstate and foreign commerce.
Since the market participant exception to the commerce clause does
not apply to AD 134, the statute is unconstitutional. Finally, a third
challenge to the validity of AD 134 may be based on the California
Constitution. Under the state constitution, the investment decisions
must be made with the exclusive purpose of serving the beneficiaries
of the trust. The use of the funds as a political boycott is in direct
violation of the enabling provision of the state constitution.
The statute, however, may not be challenged in the near future.
The stigma of supporting apartheid awaits any challenger to AD
134. After the political unrest over apartheid has subsided, AD 134
will probably still be law in California. Eventually, businesses
affected by the legislation may be more willing to assert the con-
stitutional violations created by the enactment of AD 134. The
California divestment statute, however, will serve the purported
purposes by having a lasting effect on the State of California, the
businesses in the United States, and the country of South Africa.
This effect will occur whether the statute is constitutional or not.
Christopher L. Russell
